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Sammendrag 
Offentlig støtte til barnehager er betydelig i Norge og i mange andre land. I flere land har det også 
vært et sterkt politisk ønske å bidra til økt tilbud av barnehager. En viktig målsetning er og har vært å 
legge til rette for yrkesdeltakelse blant mødre. I tillegg kan høyere inntekter hos foreldrene bidra til at 
kostnadene ved barnehage kan kompenseres av økte skatteinntekter.  
En voksende litteratur fra mange land, også Norge, viser at effekten av barnehager på kvinnelig 
yrkesdeltagelse historisk har vært relativt liten, dog med stor variasjon mellom ulike studier. Disse 
funnene svekker et av de sentrale politiske argumentene for stor offentlig støtte og innebærer at de 
ventede økningene i skatteinntekter har uteblitt. Samtidig har få studier sett på barnehagebruk for de 
yngste barna, der brorparten av utvidelsene i barnehage har kommet siden 1990-tallet. 
Vi studerer effekten av barnehagebruk for to-åringer på foreldre og besteforeldres yrkesdeltagelse på 
2000-tallet. Siden foreldre som sender sine barn i barnehage må antas å skille seg fra andre foreldre, 
særlig hva gjelder tilknytning til arbeidsmarkedet, vil en direkte sammenlikning basert på 
barnehagebruk ikke gi rimelige anslag på effektene av barnehage. For å estimere den kausale effekten 
benytter vi i stedet den store variasjonen i utbygging av barnehager i etterkant av barnehageforliket fra 
2003. Forliket økte subsidier til utbygging og drift av barnehager, åpnet for større grad av private 
tilbydere og la til rette for den påfølgende maksprisreformen. Resultatet var store sjokk til tilbudssiden 
på barnehagemarkedet, som for de minste var sterkt rasjonert gjennom store deler av 2000-tallet.  
Resultatene viser at barnehage for de minste har hatt en betydelig virkning på arbeidstilbudet blant 
mødre i Norge. For hvert tiende barn som begynner barnehage fulltid finner vi at omtrent tre mødre 
begynner å jobbe. Mens gifte og samboende mødre i hovedsak begynner å jobbe fulltid, begynner 
enslige mødre i større grad å jobbe deltid. Videre finner vi at effektene, særlig for gifte og samboende 
mødre, vedvarer over de neste 3-4 årene, men blir gradvis mindre. 
Når vi ser på yrkesdeltagelsen til fedre, finner vi ingen effekter av økt barnehagebruk. Dette kan peke 
mot at mødre fortsatt er de primære omsorgspersonene for de yngste barna. Heller ikke 
besteforeldrenes yrkestilbud ser ut til å endre seg med økt barnehagebruk. Dette kan peke mot at 
besteforeldre for de fleste familier ikke er et alternativ for daglig pass av de minste barna når 
barnehage ikke er tilgjengelig. I sum tolker vi dette som at alternativet til barnehage for flesteparten av 
de minste barna er å være hjemme sammen med mor. Dette står i kontrast til tidligere studier på eldre 
barn, der uformelle passordninger ser ut til å være det viktigste alternativet til barnehage. 
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, policymakers have shown increasing interest in government inter-
ventions in the market for child care. The OECD has discussed the introduction of early
childhood programs in several reports (OECD, 2006; Field et al., 2007); in Germany,
South Korea, Canada and the Scandinavian countries, governments have been pushing to
expand access to subsidized care. In the US, President Obama proposed to make “high-
quality preschool available to every child in America” in his State of the Union address
(2013).
An important argument in favor of governments subsidizing and facilitating child care
availability is the claim that child care helps reconcile work and family responsibilities,
thereby increasing mothers’ labor force participation (OECD, 2006). A positive impact on
labor supply may also mean that the public cost of providing child care is partly mitigated
by increases in the tax base or reduced benefit dependence.
In this paper, we estimate the labor supply and tax impacts of child care using a large
increase in child care availability for toddlers (age 2) in Norway following a bipartisan
agreement in Parliament from 2002 to promote full child care coverage. A key goal
of the reform was to facilitate parental labor force participation, under the premise that
universal child care is central to promoting gender equality in the labor market (Ministry of
Education and Research, 2003). The reform increased government subsidies to investment
in and running of child care institutions, and generated large variation in coverage between
municipalities and over time. Our estimation strategy exploits the difference in child care
expansion between municipalities to get credible estimates on how child care affects the
labor supply of both mothers and fathers, as well as other potential caregivers. Using time
and municipality fixed effects, we essentially relate the changes in labor supply to changes
in child care availability, similar to a difference-in-differences strategy. Because child care
for toddlers was strongly rationed in this period, changes in the availability should be
driven primarily by the changes in supply as a result of the reform, and not by changes
in local demand. To guard against omitted variable bias, we nonetheless document that
our estimates are robust to controlling for a large set of observable characteristics and to
a range of specification checks.
An important improvement over much of the previous literature is that we are able to
identify a large range of caregivers. In our analysis, we consider both married, cohabiting
and single mothers, as well as fathers and grandparents. Because most studies have been
restricted to look at mothers, often only married mothers, these studies might have missed
part of the effect that child care availability has on labor supply. A further improvement
is that we observe a continuous measure of the individual use of child care in our sample
each month. This allows us to implement an IV strategy, using the availability of slots in
child care as an instrument for the actual enrollment, while accounting for the intensity
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of child care use. Our estimates reflect, therefore, how the actual use of a full year of child
care affects mothers labor supply, rather than the direct effect of additional child care slots
which is estimated in most of the literature. If we believe that initial take-up of child care
is lower than in the long run, this scaling will be important to get good estimates of the
impact of child care availability on parents labor supply. Indeed, in our sample, the initial
take-up of new child care places is about one third of the full potential. Because child
care coverage is measured late in the year and child care availability is typically expanded
in the fall, it should not come as a surprise that parents are not initially exploiting new
places in child care to capacity.
Ours is also among the first papers to provide evidence on how large-scale, universal
child care for toddlers affects parental labor supply. In contrast, the sizable literature on
child care and mothers’ labor supply has been mostly focused on child care for preschoolers
(age 3–6) or even wider age groups. There are important reasons to believe that the
impact on parental labor supply differs between parents of toddlers and preschoolers.
Descriptively, young children who are not in child care are much more likely to be cared
for by one of the parents in the home (often the mother), while older children are more
often cared for by informal childminders, like relatives, friends, or nannies. This may be
due both to a stronger reluctance among parents of young children to use informal child
care arrangements, or to less supply of informal care providers for young children. Either
way, we would expect that the availability of child care for young children, may have a
stronger potential to increase labor supply of parents than availability of care for older
children.
Our results indicate that child care for toddlers has a substantial effect on mothers’
labor supply. For each 10 children enrolled in full time care, we estimate that almost 3
married mothers enter the labor force.1 This is over a baseline of 63 % participation before
the reform. For single mothers, we also find strong effects, with 2.3 mothers entering the
labor force for every 10 children that enroll in full time child care, compared to a labor
force participation of only 29 % among these mothers prior to the child care expansion.
Overall, this corresponds to a modest earnings increase of 50,000 NOK (6,000 USD)
and 20,000 NOK (2,400 USD) for cohabiting and single mothers, respectively. We also
investigate persistence in the labor supply response, finding positive impacts 1–3 years
later.
Proponents of subsidized child care commonly claim that parts of the cost of such
subsidies are offset by the increased tax revenues or reduced benefits generated by the
additional income of working mothers. Using data on net tax payments, we can go beyond
the back-of-the-envelope calculations in previous literature, to show that the increased
1Throughout, we refer to married and cohabiting mothers interchangably - our main sample consists
of both married mothers and unmarried mothers living together with the child and the father of the child,
as cohabitation without marriage is common in Norway.
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taxes from the additional income is indeed considerable, implying a marginal tax rate of
about 40 % on the extra income, close to the average tax rate. At the same time, the
increased use of child care and employment does not seem to lead to significant reductions
in benefits, which would further have reduced public spending.2
For fathers and grandparents we find no labor supply response. This may indicate that
mothers are still the primary caretakers, staying home when child care is not available.
The lack of response among working age grandparents could indicate that they are not
important informal caregivers for young children in our sample, at least not to the extent
that it affects their labor supply. This supports the notion that the counterfactual mode
of care may be different for toddlers and preschoolers, which could be a key insight when
considering how child care may affect child development.
Our paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature estimating how child care
availability affects parental labor supply using quasi-experimental methods. The evidence
from these studies usually indicates relatively small effects of child care expansion. In the
US, for instance economically small effects are found by Gelbach (2002), Cascio (2009),
and Fitzpatrick (2010, 2012). Similar patterns are found in several European countries,
see e.g. Lundin et al. (2008), Goux and Maurin (2010), Havnes and Mogstad (2011),
Dustmann et al. (2013) or Felfe et al. (2013). A prominent exception is the reform in
Quebec studied by Baker et al. (2008) and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008), where the
estimated impact on mothers’ labor supply is substantial.
The lack of robust evidence in previous literature in support of a tight link between
parental labor supply and child care availability or prices is disappointing from a policy
perspective, since increasing mothers’ labor supply is a key policy goal in many countries.
Our estimates suggest that the modest effects could be explained by two things: First,
the take-up of child care in the initial periods following child care expansions may not
be complete. Indeed, in our case, the start of the child care year in August implies
that the child will usually attend at most five months of care in the first year. Second,
as emphasized by e.g. Havnes and Mogstad (2011), substitution into formal care from
informal sources rather than home care would suggest that effects of child care are smaller
than might be initially expected. In this case, rather than releasing mothers to the labor
market, child care is taken up by mothers who are already working and relying on some
form of informal care arrangement. Our results then suggests that informal sources of
care may be less important as an alternative to formal care for younger compared to older
children. Both alternatives imply that the potential for child care policies to stimulate
mothers’ labor supply may be larger than suggested in much of the previous literature,
particularly for younger kids.
2Note that this does not include the mechanical effect on the substantial cash-for-care benefit tied
to child care use in subsidized child care, nor does it include the parental copayment. Combined, these
imply a parental cost of full time child care use of about NOK 80,000 per year.
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The paper proceeds as follows: We first cover the institutional setting and the child
care reform in Section 2, while Section 3 presents the registry data used for estimation,
the samples of interest and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our IV method
with fixed effects. Results are found in Section 5, including persistency analysis. We
perform a range of robustness checks to support our estimates in Section 6, while section
7 concludes. Additional tables are found in the appendix.
2 Institutional setting and the child care reform
Although the roots of the Norwegian child care system date back to the early 19th cen-
tury,3 the system of universal child care was introduced after WWII as a response to
increasing female labor force participation and the goal of gender equality in the Nordic
welfare model (Ministry of Education and Research, 1998). Increasing excess demand
for formal care in the 60’s and 70’s led to the Kindergarten Act of 1975, and a strong
increase in the supply of formal child care for preschool children (Havnes and Mogstad,
2011), eventually leading to a high coverage rate for preschool children by 1990.
Figure 1a shows the trends in child care coverage rates for preschoolers and toddlers
from 1998–2012. By 2000, about 80% of 3–6 year olds were enrolled in formal child care.
At the same time, coverage was much lower for younger children. In 2000, less than 40%
of 1–2 year olds in Norway were enrolled in child care, and there was substantial excess
demand for child care, see. the discussion in Section 4 below.
This excess demand for formal child care was the background for the Kindergarten
concord, a reform passed in the Norwegian Parliament in 2002 with broad bipartisan
support. The main goal of the reform was to offer affordable child care to all children,
and to secure quality and diversity in child care services (Ministry of Education and
Research, 2003). The concord aimed to achieve these goals through increased subsidies,
lower parental fees and investment subsidies for the construction of new child care slots.
The concord also established equal treatment of private and public child care institutions,
where private institutions had previously been awarded only 85 % of the subsidy rate
offered to public institutions, and thus made it easier for private suppliers of care to enter
the market.
Figure 1 presents some important changes in the child care sector following the reform.
Panel 1b depicts the total investment in child care institutions over the period.4 Note that
most investments appear with a lag of 1–2 years, as they were applied for and disbursed
after the slot was opened. The figure shows clearly how total investments increased rapidly
following the reform. Panel 1c shows the increase in total subsidies per child per year.
Panel 1d shows the changes in the composition of the costs covered by the municipality,
3See Ministry of Education and Research (2009) for a thorough treatment.
4All monetary values are given in 2014 Norwegian crowns.
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Figure 1: Child care coverage rates, investments and financing in the 2000’s.
Sources: Statistics Norway and regjeringen.no.
the central government and parental fees. It is clear that the share of costs covered by
parents has declined significantly. This figure also shows that municipal support was not
reduced as a response to the increased government subsidies. The large overall increase
in expenditures over the period is a result of both more children in care, higher subsidy
rates, and an increasing share of toddlers, requiring more staff and resources per child.
Throughout the period we consider, formal childcare was highly regulated in Norway.
In order to be eligible for the generous subsidies, both private and public child care
institutions have to adhere to strict criterias governing the quality of the services supplied.
These criteria relate to for instance the ratio of pedagogical staff per to children, opening
hours, parental involvement and available playing space per child (Kindergarten Act,
2005). Since 2004, the institutions also must adhere to the max price reform, that put
a cap of 2,750 NOK (around 330 USD) on the fee that can be charged from parents for
a full time slot. In 2006, this cap was further lowered to 2,250 NOK. In practice, this
ensures that formal child care institutions are relatively homogenous in terms of observable
attributes of quality and price.
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As illustrated in Figure 1a, the reform resulted in a sharp increase in municipal cover-
age rates for 1 and 2-year olds. Over a nine year period, coverage for toddlers increased by
over 40 percentage points, from 37 % in 2001 to 80 % in 2010. In our empirical analysis,
we will attempt to evaluate the impact of this massive increase in child care coverage on
the labor supply of mothers and fathers.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data is based on rich administrative registers available from Statistics Norway, and
cover the entire resident population in 2002–2008. The data contain individual infor-
mation on demographics (e.g. sex, age, immigrant status, marital status, number of
children), socioeconomic status (e.g. years of education, income, taxes paid, employment
status), and municipality of residence. Income and employment data are collected from
tax records and other administrative registers. The household information is from the
Central Population Register, which is updated annually by the local population registries
and verified by the Norwegian Tax Authority. We also have access to national registry
data on municipal child care coverage reported by the child care institutions themselves.
Importantly, the data contain unique personal identifiers that allow us to match children
to parents, to grandparents and to other caregivers residing with the child. We also uti-
lize various municipality characteristics from Statistics Norway, including data on rural
and urban population, employment by sector and gender, political representation and
municipal income and spending.
Below, we first define our estimation sample and then discuss how we measure the key
variables in our analysis, namely child care use, child care coverage and labor supply. We
conclude this section by providing descriptive statistics for our sample.
To define the population of interest, we start with all 2-year olds alive and resident
in Norway in 2002–2008. Following most of the literature, we focus attention on the
youngest child in the household, and exclude multiple births and children with younger
siblings born to the same mother or father.5 We also exclude children with unknown
mothers and a handful of families with more than one child in the sample. This leaves us
with a sample of 323,164 children.
We next identify all working-age household members of these children (ie. aged 18
to 67). We consider cohabiting mothers and fathers to be parents that live in the same
household as the child. Notice that our definition of cohabiting parents includes both
married and non-married couples. If both parents are not present in the child’s household,
we identify suitable stepfathers or stepmothers from age, family relations and gender of
the present parent. This allows us to identify the likely caregivers relevant for the vast
5Fertility could be considered endogenous to the child care expansion. In section 6, we include also
children with younger siblings to verify that this sample restriction is not driving our results.
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majority of the children in the sample. From population registers, we can also identify
mothers and fathers that do not reside with the children, as well as grandmothers and
grandfathers. Our main samples of interest will be cohabiting mothers and fathers, as
well as single mothers and non-residing fathers.
To measure individual child care use, we exploit the administrative registers of cash-
for-care (CFC) recipients, available for two year olds since 1999. Under the CFC-scheme,
all families with children below three years old who were not enrolled in subsidized child
care were eligible for a substantial cash benefit.6 From the CFC-registers, we know which
children receive the CFC-benefit each month and the exact amount disbursed. As long
as eligible parents take up the benefit, we can infer the child care use of each child.
This approach has the advantage of giving a comprehensive measure of child care use
over the year, to allow correctly scaling the impact of child care expansions that are not
immediately taken up. Our final measure gives for each child the fraction of full-time
equivalent months of child care use during the year.7
To measure child care coverage in each municipality, we use the share of children in
child care to the population of the same age from municipal reports, measured around
October each year, when enrollment in the regular calendar year is completed. These
data are readily available from Statistics Norway.8 Similar measures are used regularly in
the literature, see e.g. Havnes and Mogstad, 2011; Dustmann et al., 2013; Nollenberger
and Rodríguez-Planas, 2015.
One potential issue with these measures is that in clearing markets child care coverage
will be determined jointly by demand and supply. Exploiting variation in coverage rates
may then pick up demand shocks, which would raise the potential for reverse causality
and estimation bias. If the demand for child care exceeds supply, then the variation in
coverage should be determined uniquely by the variation in supply. In order to verify
anecdotal evidence that rationing is prevalent here, we would like to have data on the
number of applications in each municipality. Unfortunately, this data is not available. As
an alternative, we secured access to survey data on waiting lists collected on behalf of the
Ministry of Education. The survey collected information from municipalities on the num-
ber of children 0–3 years old who were on waiting lists for child care in each municipality
by September 20th over 2004–2009.9 By adding children enrolled and children on waiting
6Over the period the CFC benefit varied from 2,200 to 3,600 NOK per month per child, equivalent to
approximately 260 - 430 USD per month using the December 2017 exchange rate.
7We thus consider a full year of part time care (about 20 hours per week) to be equivalent to one half
year of full time care. We have experimented with other measures, without this substantially changing
the results.
8http://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken, table 04683. In a few cases a municipality will have a
coverage rate slightly above 1 because children from neighboring municipalities attend care. These have
been adjusted to 1.
9The data were collected by Asplan Viak in order for the Ministry to monitor the progress towards
full child care coverage.
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Figure 2: Child care application and coverage rates for 0–3 year olds
Note: Application rates are constructed by adding the number of children in care to the reported number
of children on waiting lists for care and dividing by the number of children in the municipality. Sources:
Reports from Asplan Viak (2010) and Statistics Norway.
lists, we can construct a measure of the child care application rate.
Figure 2 draws the child care coverage rate and our measure of the child care ap-
plication rate for 0–3 year olds over our estimation period. Throughout the period, the
application rate is substantially higher than the coverage rate, by between 10 and 15
percentage points, indicating excess demand. Additionally, we suspect that the strong
growth in demand over time may be due to applications from parents who were discour-
aged from applying when coverage was particularly low. If so, then rationing in the early
period is likely to be even stronger than reflected in these numbers. Note that these data
were collected for the combined group of 0–3 year olds only, so do not speak directly
to the instruments we will use below (coverage for 1 and 2-year olds). However, this is
again likely to cause us to underestimate the level of rationing, since the vast majority
of children will neither apply nor enroll in child care in the first year of life, when their
parents are on parental leave.10 In our robustness analysis below, we use this data to in-
vestigate the potential for reverse causality by restricting focus to more severely rationed
municipalities.
To measure labor supply we exploit two alternative data sources. First, we use yearly
earnings from wages and self-employment collected from tax records. As outcome vari-
ables, we use both earnings directly, as well as dummy variables for labor market par-
10In 2002, Norwegian parents were entitled to 42 (52) weeks of parental leave with 100 % (80 %) wage
compensation, expanded to 43 (53) weeks in 2005 and 44 (54) weeks in 2006. Parents are further entitled
to one year each of unpaid leave in immediate continuation of regular parental leave.
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ticipation based on the basic amounts in the Norwegian Social Insurance Scheme (used
to define labor market status, determe eligibility for unemployment benefits as well as
disability and old age pension). Specifically, we follow Havnes and Mogstad (2011) and
construct dummy variables for employment and full-time equivalent status that equal one
if earnings exceed 2 and 4 basic amounts, respectively, and zero otherwise. In 2014, one
basic amount equaled 88, 370 NOK, or approximately 11, 000 USD. The tax records ad-
ditionally provide data on total tax payments and transfers and benefits that we use as
additional outcomes to evaluate the impact on public spending and income.
Second, we use data from the matched employer–employee register, with information
about all public employees and for about 80 % of private employees. These data give
information on start and end dates of employment spells, and bracketed information on
contracted hours in each spell. From these data, we construct yearly measures of labor
supply as the number of weeks during the year when contracted hours are above 4 hours
and above 30 hours. A caveat in using these outcomes is that we set labor supply to zero
when information is missing in the data. This will tend to drive down the level of labor
supply compared to the true level. This should not, however, affect our estimates unless
the pattern of missing observation is changing over time and these changes are correlated
with changes in child care coverage rates.
Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics for the children and the four main samples of caregivers are given in
Table 1 and 2. We see that the sample of children is well balanced with respect to gender,
and that children have one older sibling on average. The average child care use is 0.47,
corresponding to 5.3 months of full time child care use. Table 2 gives descriptive statistics
for four groups of caregivers: cohabiting mothers, cohabiting fathers, single mothers and
non-residing fathers. We notice immediately in panel A the substantial differences in terms
of labor supply. Single mothers are least attached to the labor market, with only 31 %
employed and 15 % in full time-equivalent employment. In comparison, cohabiting fathers
are strongly attached to the labor market, with 91 % employed and 84 % full time. Also
cohabiting mothers are much more attached to the labor market than single mothers,
with about 68 % employed, and 40 % in full time. These differences are mirrored in
their earnings, where cohabiting fathers on average make almost twice that of cohabiting
mothers, and more than four times that of single mothers. We also note that labor supply
measured in terms of the number of weeks with contracted hours above 4 and 30 hours
reflect well the overall picture from the earnings-based measures.
Panel B of Table 2 presents means of control variables for the four groups of caregivers.
We note that cohabiting mothers and fathers have about 15 years of completed education.
The table also shows single mothers and non-residing fathers have substantially less edu-
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cation and are around three years younger than cohabiting parents. Meanwhile, fathers
are about three years older than mothers, and somewhat less likely to be of immigrant
background.
To get a first look at the trends in labor force participation among these groups, Figure
3 investigates labor force participation over the period for the four groups of caregivers
separately. For comparison, we also include the trend for working age women with no
school aged children. We note that just over 60 % of these women are employed, of which
about two thirds is full time. For both measures, however, the overall trend is relatively
flat over the period.
If the large increase in child care availability has an effect on parents’ labor supply, we
would expect that this was evident in the figure by an increase in labor supply relative
to the observed pattern for the rest of the labor force. For cohabiting fathers in our
sample, the trend is very similar to the overall trend, with little change over time, though
with employment above 90 %, the level is clearly higher. In contrast, both cohabiting and
single mothers experienced substantial increases in the labor force participation over these
years. In particular, employment rates among both sets of mothers increased by about 10
percentage points, driven largely by full time-equivalent employment among cohabiting
mothers, but less so among single mothers. Also non-residing fathers experienced an
increase in labor force participation from the mid 2000’s, following a slump in the early
period.
Given the large increase in child care coverage rates affecting these groups, it is tempt-
ing to interpret this as first evidence of how the child care reform impacted on parents’
employment. This would be premature, however, since we cannot at this point distin-
guish between general increases in labor force participation of mothers, and the potential
impact of the child care expansion. We discuss how we tackle this question in the next
section.
Finally, Table 3 presents means of control variables for cohabiting mothers biennially
over our estimation period 2002–2008. We note that most variables exhibit a flat trend
over time, which suggests that the composition of mothers is relatively stable over time.
The exceptions are the growth in immigrant background from about 8 % to 11 % and a
small increase in education. Similar patterns are seen for the other groups of caregivers,
which are reported in the appendix for brevity, see tables A.1–A.3.
4 Empirical strategy
The most straightforward way to estimate the effect of child care on labor supply is to
regress a measure of labor supply on child care use. This ignores, however, that child care
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all children at age 2, 2002–2008.
Children
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Male 0.49 0.50 0 1
Child care use 0.47 0.42 0 1
Older paternal siblings 0.99 1.00 0 15
Older maternal siblings 1.00 1.06 0 17
Child care coverage rates
One year olds, t− 1 0.41 0.17 0 1
Two year olds 0.67 0.18 0 1
Observations 323,164
Note: Variables are defined in Section 3.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for caregivers at child age 2.
Cohabiting Cohabiting Single Non-residing
mothers fathers mothers fathers
A. Outcome variables
Earnings (NOK) 205,350 408,563 94,361 253,305
Tax 73,520 172,905 31,146 103,635
Transfers, excl. cash for care 44,331 14,474 155,084 39,550
Employed 0.678 0.914 0.309 0.700
Full-time eq. 0.399 0.841 0.150 0.540
Weeks of 4 hours 37.18 43.59 21.36 32.16
employment above 30 hours 26.47 41.70 13.17 29.01
B. Control variables
Age 32.65 35.55 29.52 32.47
Immigrant 0.0977 0.0742 0.0878 0.0799
Years of education 15.36 15.04 13.15 12.92
Number of children 2.028 2.056 1.720 1.820
below 6 years old 1.517 1.516 1.282 1.331
below 13 years old 1.893 1.878 1.554 1.597
below 18 years old 1.994 1.986 1.667 1.720
Local labor market control 0.719 0.719 0.715 0.714
Observations 283,868 283,687 33,291 29,276
Note: Outcome and control variables are defined in Section 3.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for cohabiting mothers, 2002–2008.
2002 2004 2006 2008
A. Outcome variables
Earnings (NOK) 165,232 184,939 216,557 261,708
(135,929) (176,877) (168,514) (183,528)
Tax 67,042 86,315 71,621 76,947
(74,096) (94,643) (78,988) (139,871)
Transfers, 49,843 45,097 42,144 39,825
excl. cash for care (43,246) (49,117) (47,954) (49,185)
Employed 0.634 0.647 0.695 0.747
(0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.43)
Full-time eq. employment 0.351 0.370 0.418 0.474
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50)
Weeks of 4 hours 35.00 36.28 37.79 40.05
employment (22.4) (22.2) (21.3) (19.9)
above 30 hours 23.57 25.45 27.37 29.89
(24.6) (24.8) (24.7) (24.4)
B. Control variables
Age 32.28 32.56 32.84 32.88
(4.82) (4.83) (4.83) (4.92)
Immigrant 0.0838 0.0903 0.103 0.116
(0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.32)
Years of education 14.96 15.26 15.52 15.70
(3.21) (3.20) (3.20) (3.22)
Number of children 2.048 2.033 2.026 2.002
(0.99) (1.00) (0.98) (0.98)
below 6 years old 1.513 1.515 1.517 1.524
(0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58)
below 13 years old 1.912 1.893 1.892 1.873
(0.84) (0.83) (0.83) (0.82)
below 18 years old 2.013 1.999 1.994 1.967
(0.94) (0.94) (0.93) (0.92)
Participation, working age childless men 0.676 0.706 0.726 0.800
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.047)
42,186 39,309 40,211 41,762
Note: The table gives biannual means and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the estimation sample.
Variables are defined in Section 3.
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Figure 3: Labor force participation for different caregivers in our estimation sample and
for working age women in Norway over 2001–2009.
Note: Employment and full time-equivalent is defined as earnings above 2 and 4 basic amounts (BA),
respectively, see Section 3. 1BA ≈ NOK88, 000 ≈ USD11, 000.
use is endogenous to parents’ labor supply decisions. Clearly, parents that enroll their
children in child care are likely to be more tied to the labor market. This simple approach
is therefore likely to yield estimates of how child care use affects labor supply that are
biased upwards.
Imagine instead a social experiment that randomized child care access at the mu-
nicipal level. This randomization breaks the correlation between child care access and
unobserved determinants of parental labor supply. Comparing labor supply of parents
in municipalities with and without child care access would give a reduced form estimate
of the effect of child care access on parental labor supply. Comparing child care use in
municipalities with and without child care access would give a first stage estimate of the
effect of child care access on child care use. Taking the ratio between the two we would
get an IV-estimate of the effect of child care use on parental labor supply.
The intention of our IV-approach is to mimic this hypothetical experiment. We exploit
the staggered expansion in child care following the 2002 child care concord, which gener-
ated large spatial and temporal variation in child care coverage rates. The distribution of
municipal child care coverage rates for 1–2-year-olds is illustrated in Figure 4. The figure
shows both the strong increase in child care coverage over the period we consider, and
the large variation across municipalities.
Our basic IV strategy is the following: For each municipality and every year, we
instrument individual child care use, mikt, with the child care coverage rates of 1-year-
olds in t−1, CC1k,t−1, and of 2-year-olds in t, CC2kt.11 Specifically, we estimate the following
11In the first stage of our IV model below, we regress child care use on municipal child care coverage
rates. Some readers may find that this resembles a poorly designed peer effects analysis, regressing
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Figure 4: The distribution of child care coverage rates for 2-year-olds across municipalities
over 2002–2008.
Note: The figure draws the mean child care coverage rate nationally over time (bullets and dashed line)
and the distribution across municipalities (bars). Data, estimation sample and variable definitions are
discussed in Section 3.
2SLS-model in our sample of caregivers of 2-year old children:12
yikt = α2k + τ 2t + βmikt +Xiktθ1 + 2ikt (1)
mikt = α1k + τ 1t + pi1CC1k,t−1 + pi2CC2kt +Xiktθ2 + 1ikt (2)
where αsk and τ st are municipality and time fixed effects in stage s. In our robustness
analysis, we show that our estimates do not depend on the inclusion of controls. In our
baseline model, however, we include controls for the vectorXikt which contains child, care-
giver and municipality characteristics: Child characteristics include dummies for gender
and month of birth, the number of older paternal and maternal siblings, and dummies
for parents’ level of completed education.13 Caregiver characteristics include age, age
squared, a dummy for immigrant background and the number of children below ages 6,
individual outcomes on group means (for a detailed discussion of why this should be a bad idea, see
Angrist (2014)). But note that our measures of municipal child care coverage rates are distinct from the
individual child care user rates, both due to the time of measurement, in the stock versus flow properties,
and in the reflection of extensive and intensive margins. Indeed, if we use the municipality-year means
of child care use as an instrument, the F-statistic is 8,300 with a coefficient close to 1, as expected. In
contrast, our first stage yields an F-statistic of 45, with coefficients of .3 and .05. Note also that this
discussion has no bearing on the validity of our instruments or the reduced form.
12All models are estimated using the Stata command reghdfe (Correia, 2014).
13Rather than dropping a handful of observations with missing education data, we use a separate
dummy for caregivers with missing education.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the IV strategy: Predicted residual labor supply versus predicted
residual child care use.
Note: The figure graphs child care use against labor supply outcomes after removing time and municipality
fixed effects, see discussion in the main text. Scatter points are binned to 0.005 and the size of each point
represent the number of observations in that bin. Data, estimation sample and variable definitions are
discussed in Section 3.
11 and 18. We also include dummies for level of education to control flexibly for returns to
education, including potential sheepskin effects. Finally, we control for local labor market
conditions in the municipality of residence, as measured by the labor force participation
rate of working age men (20–67 years old) without children. Descriptive statistics for
these variables are reported in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
To illustrate our IV strategy graphically, the panels of Figure 5 draws scatter plots
of labor supply against predicted child care use, purged of time and municipality fixed
effects.14 The figure suggests that there is a strong effect of predicted child care use on
labor supply, and that the relationship is well approximated by a linear function in the
bulk of the data.
Next, we graphically present the changes around the timing of the greatest growth in
each municipality in Figure 6. To this end, we first purge all variables of municipality
means using fixed effects. We then regress residual child care use on residual coverage
rates, controlling for year fixed effects, and predict a scalar instrument that represents
only the variation we exploit. Then we recenter the data so that time zero is the year
with the highest increase in predicted child care use for each municipality relative to the
aggregate increase.
The top panels of Figure 6 graphs the trends in labor supply alongside the trend in child
14Specifically, we estimated Equation (2) without covariates and predicted the individual child care use
from the instruments. We then regress both the predicted child care use and the outcomes individually
on calendar time and municipality fixed effects, and predict the residuals.
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Figure 6: Event study graphs: Changes in outcomes (top panels) and around the time of
the largest growth in child care coverage rates.
Note: The figure graphs outcomes and some important covariates over time after removing effects of time,
municipality and controls, see equations (1) and (2). Data are recentered so that year 0 is the year with
the largest growth in predicted child care use for each municipality. The scale of the outcome variables
(left axis) is in standard deviations of the variable in the sample of cohabiting mothers, while the scale
of predicted child care coverage is in percentage points. Data, estimation sample and variable definitions
are discussed in Section 3.
care use as predicted from our instruments. At time zero, we see a substantial increase in
predicted child care use of around 7 percentage points (relative to the aggregate increase
that year), while the trend is otherwise relatively flat. This illustrates that our first stage
is relevant and quite strong. We also see that as predicted child care use jumps up, labor
participation also increases, by around .1, .05 and .04 standard deviations for income,
employment and full time-equivalent, respectively. Taking the fraction of these estimates
suggests an IV-estimate of around 32 percentage points increase in labor participation
from full time child care use for the employment outcome. Below, we elaborate on this
within our estimation framework.
To evaluate our IV-strategy, note that the identifying assumption roughly relies on
common time shocks across municipalities that expand early and late. If this assumption
is violated, for instance by labor supply leading child care expansions, then this should
show up in Figure 6 as trends or jumps in the outcome prior to the expansion that is
unrelated to increases in predicted child care use. On the contrary, the figure shows that
the trends in labor participation are relatively flat in the pre-period, following closely the
trend in predicted child care use. This suggests that our IV-strategy is sound.
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There are two potential selection issues when estimating our parameter of interest β.
The first is selection on gains: If parents in some municipalities respond more strongly to
child care access than others, and this is correlated with the child care expansion, then our
estimates of how child care affects parental labor supply will differ from the average effect
in the population. It will be a consistent estimator of the effect for the subpopulation that
is affected, but not for the whole population. In the terminology of Imbens and Angrist
(1994), our estimate will be a local average treatment effect (LATE), or more precisely
a weighted average of all potential LATEs as our instruments are continuous. In the
presence of heterogeneous treatment effects, our estimates reflect the average treatment
effect among compliers, roughly parents of children that took up the newly available
slots. We think this is a policy relevant group whether or not they are representative of
the population at large.
Second, we could worry about selection on unobservables: If expansions in child care
coverage are, for instance, positively correlated with other determinants of labor supply,
then our estimates will be biased upwards. Note first that the fixed effects will controll
for all time invariant differences between municipalities, and for all common time shocks.
Our concerns should, therefore, be focused on changes in potential confounders within
municipalities. The most immediate threat to our identification is arguably that child
care demand is driving the variation in child care coverage that we exploit, which might
bias our estimates upwards.
In Section 3 above, we discussed this issue at some length, and concluded that this
is unlikely, since demand is substantially higher than supply over the period we study.
However, to further investigate this issue we check whether the composition in our sample
is changing over time by looking at observables. Even though we control for these flexibly
in our regressions, changes in the composition of observables might raise concerns about
changes in the composition also in terms of unobservables. In the lower panels of Figure
6, we have reproduced the graphical illustration above for some key predictors of parental
labor supply, where we have again recentered our data so that time zero is the year with
the highest increase in predicted child care use, and we have purged the variables of
municipality fixed effects. It is reassuring to see that, across the bottom panels of Figure
6, the jump in predicted child care use is not associated with changes in the covariates.
On the contrary, the changes in the covariates are quite smooth over the period, with no
apparent break at time zero.
Finally, even with the large set of control variables that we include in our estimations,
one may still worry about changes in unobservable determinants of labor supply. After
our main results, we will therefore further probe the validity of our empirical strategy by
assessing the stability of the IV estimates to alternative specifications, and by performing
placebo tests. It is comforting to see that these specification checks by and large lend
support to our estimation strategy.
20
5 Results
Baseline results for the four main samples of interest are reported in Table 4. In panel A,
we report estimates from our first stage. The instruments are relevant and strong, with F -
statistics on the excluded instruments above 30 in all samples. Estimates in row 1 indicate
that an additional child care slot for one year olds increases by about 30 percentage points
the child care use of two year olds the following year. Estimates in row 2 indicate that
an additional child care slot for two year olds increases by about 4 percentage points the
child care use of two year olds in the same year. The coefficients are similar across groups,
suggesting that the take-up of child care slots is relatively homogenous across children
when we consider different caregivers.
In panel B, we report estimates from our second stage for a number of different out-
comes, where reported coefficients are on child care use in separate IV regressions. We
also include for each outcome the mean of the dependent variable prior to the child care
expansion as a point of reference (underlined).
Our IV estimates indicate quite substantial labor supply responses among mothers.15
In particular, employment among cohabiting mothers is estimated to increase by 29
percentage points when a child is enrolled in full time child care, of which around half is
to full time-equivalent employment. This is confirmed by the estimated effect on weeks
of employment from the matched employer-employee register, which show that child care
use causes mothers to increase their employment by about 10 weeks. Compared to the
prereform means, these effects imply an increase of around 50 % in the mean employment
rates of cohabiting mothers of two-year olds and suggest that child care plays an important
role in getting mothers of small children (back) into the labor market.
When we consider earnings of cohabiting mothers directly, our estimates indicate that
child care use caused an increase of about 50,000 NOK per year, a 30 % increase over the
pre-reform mean. At the same time, we estimate that taxes paid increase by about 19,000
NOK, while there is a small decrease in transfers. Combined, this reduces the individual
benefit of child care in terms of disposable income by about 40 %.16
Though imprecise, the estimates on cohabiting fathers show that their earnings drop
with child care use, by an amount similar to the increase among cohabiting mothers. That
15Note that the IV estimates contrast starkly with the OLS estimates. As an example, the OLS
coefficients for earnings are more than twice as large as the IV coefficents for both single and cohabiting
mothers. This is in line with our intuition about the direction of the bias of the OLS coefficient, which
is caused by reverse causality: Mothers who work more demand more child care.
16Note that this is very close to the average tax rate of 41 % that these women paid before the reform.
Although we might expect that the nonlinearities in the tax schedule could make the marginal tax rate
different from the average tax rate, this seems not to be the case. This means that the simple back-of-
the-envelope calculations in e.g. Baker et al. (2005), wouldn’t be far off in our setting. This does not
hold, however, in the other samples we consider, where the implied marginal tax rate is about 18 %
among cohabiting fathers and is even negative for single mothers and non-residing fathers, albeit very
imprecisely estimated.
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Table 4: IV-results: The impact of child care use on labor supply
Cohabiting Cohabiting Single Non-residing
mothers fathers mothers fathers
A. First stage
CC1k,t−1 0.311*** 0.309*** 0.285*** 0.400***
(0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0382) (0.0325)
CC2k,t 0.0416** 0.0440** 0.0254 0.0624**
(0.0207) (0.0202) (0.0334) (0.0307)
F 45.23 45.84 30.59 161.0
B. Second stage
Earnings 49,231*** -45,971 19,340 -8,241
(12,612) (32,269) (28,999) (26,111)
165,232 356,127 76,279 227,717
Tax 19,018*** -8,411 -6,350 -17,492
(5,467) (11,901) (13,986) (13,658)
67,042 162,260 32,572 96,308
Transfers, -3,360 -584 38,780** 6,401
excl. cash for care (4,153) (3,647) (18,020) (7,757)
49,843 12,953 156,275 35,143
Employed 0.294*** -0.0187 0.225** -0.0158
(0.0298) (0.0219) (0.107) (0.0502)
0.634 0.919 0.289 0.717
Full-time 0.222*** 0.00848 0.0486 0.0330
equivalent (0.0278) (0.0288) (0.0737) (0.0624)
0.351 0.848 0.133 0.560
Weeks of 4 hours 9.741*** -0.0966 12.24** -1.343
employment (1.527) (1.351) (5.817) (2.615)
above 35.00 43.38 19.49 31.67
30 hours 11.02*** -0.568 2.424 -1.053
(1.588) (1.500) (4.485) (2.612)
23.57 41.65 11.49 28.85
Observations 283,868 283,687 33,288 29,272
Note: Estimates are from equations (1) and (2). Outcome and control variables are defined in Section 3.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to parents of children born in 20022-year olds in
2002. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
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fathers work less when mothers work more is consistent with joint labor supply decisions
in the household. Note however, that there are virtually no effects among fathers on the
qualitative employment or full time margins, suggesting that effects on fathers are on the
intensive margin, not the extensive. This is in line with the contention that father’s labor
force participation is largely independent of the family situation.
Considering that cohabiting mothers and fathers are usually members of the same
household, our point estimates suggest a small drop in disposable household income. Add
to this the mechanical drop in cash-for-care subsidies and the copayment for child care,
each about 40,000 NOK per year, and it is clear that child care use is quite costly to
parents. Indeed, the overall drop in disposable income corresponds to almost the full
after-tax earnings of cohabiting mothers before the child care expansion.
Turning to single mothers, the estimates indicate that they also respond strongly
on the employment margin, with an increase of about 23 percentage points. In contrast,
there is hardly any impact on full time-equivalent employment. This is supported by the
estimates from the employer-employee register, which records effects only on employment
below 30 hours per week. These estimates support the notion that the effect for single
mothers represent shifts to part-time employment, not low-wage jobs. That single mothers
respond mostly on the employment margin may be explained in part by a sizable increase
in transfers, likely due to an increase in the transitional benefit for single parents. With
access to child care, these parents would be expected to have a much easier time meeting
the activity requirements linked to this benefit.17 In addition, full time work is likely more
costly for single parents, who donot have the same possibility to share household tasks.
Though the estimates are somewhat imprecise, when we factor in the estimated increases
in earnings and transfers and the drop in taxes paid, our results indicate that the increase
in disposable earnings is almost sufficient to make up for the parental copayment and the
loss of cash-for-care.
Estimates on non-residing fathers are not sufficiently precise to draw firm conclu-
sions, but are in general close to zero, lending little support to child care as an important
driver of labor supply decisions for this group.
We have also investigated the labor supply response among grandparents, under the
hypothesis that these may be relevant informal caregivers for these very young children.
If so, and if grandparents are still attached to the labor market, we would expect to see
effects on the labor supply of working age grandparents. However, we find no systematic
evidence of labor supply responses among grandparents, despite a strong first stage and
relatively high labor force participation rates. This may suggest that grandparents are
not important caregivers for toddlers in our sample, at least not to the extent that it
17The transitional benefit (“overgangsstønad”) is paid to single mothers who are at least 50 % employed,
in work-related training or actively searching for a job. In 2014, the transitional benefit is 2.25 times
the basic amount, i.e. about 200,000 NOK per year. The benefit is subject to regular income tax and is
reduced by 45 % of any income above 0.5 basic amounts.
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affects their labor supply. Results are reported in Table A.4 in the appendix.18
We can use our results to calculate the net budgetary cost of an additional child in
full time care at the time of use. Using 2008 as the base year, the state subsidies for
one full time child in care was 107,500 NOK. In addition, the municipalities covered on
average 28.4 % of the total subsidies to the sector, adding up to an estimated 150,000
NOK in state and municipal subsidies. The increased taxes from the additional labor
supply of cohabiting mothers is 19,000 NOK, meaning that around 13% of the costs of
the subsidies are offset by increased tax revenues. In addition, the cash for care benefits
are mechanically reduced by around 36,000 NOK, increasing the share of covered subsidies
to around 37%. For single mothers, there is no cost offset because the reduction in cash
for care benefits are offset by increases in other benefits.
Heterogeneity over the earnings distribution
Providing low-cost child care can also be a tool to level the playing field between families
from different backgrounds. To investigate this further, we construct dummy variables
for earnings brackets based on the same basic amounts we used to construct our basic
measures of labor participation (around 88,000 NOK or 11,000 USD). Specifically, we
construct seven mutually exclusive dummy variables that are equal to one if earnings fall
below one basic amount, between one and two basic amounts, between two and three
basic amounts, and so on, with the last category being earnings above six basic amounts
(i.e. 528,000 NOK). We then estimate the same IV-model using these dummy variables
successively as dependent variables. This allows us to study binned parts of the marginal
distribution of earnings to get an impression of what parts of the distribution are affected
by the child care expansion. Since the overall impact on fathers is small, we consider only
mothers in this exercise.
Figure 7 shows the marginal distribution in 2002, i.e. the mean of our dummy variables,
as bullets. The IV estimate is represented in bars with associated confidence intervals.
In the left panel we report estimates for cohabiting mothers. The bullets (measured on
the right axis) show that prior to the child care expansion, almost 25 % of cohabiting
mothers earned below one basic amount, leaving them essentially out of the labor force.
For the remaining cohabiting mothers, the distribution of earnings was relatively flat,
with 10–15 % in each bracket. In contrast, the distribution for single mothers reported
in the right panel of Figure 7 is heavily skewed, with 62 percent in the lowest earnings
bracket and population shares below 10 % and steadily declining as we move up in the
distribution.
18We also looked at grandparents residing in the same muncipality as the child separately, believing
that these might have an easier time providing care or an easier time combining care and work, but found
no significant differences between these and grandparents living further away from the child. Results are
available upon request.
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Figure 7: The impact of child care use on the earnings distribution of mothers.
Note: Estimates are from equations (1) and (2). Outcome and control variables are defined in Section
3. 95 % confidence intervals are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Pre-reform means refer to parents of 2-year olds in 2002.
The bars in Figure 7 (measured on the left axis) give the estimated impact of child
care use on the probability of ending up in each bracket. The estimates reveal strong
heterogeneity. In particular, cohabiting mothers seem to be shifting away from both of
the two lowest brackets, and into the two middle brackets close to the threshold for full
time-equivalent employment that we used above. Single mothers, on the other hand, seem
to shift away from the lowest bracket to the lower middle brackets, pointing towards an
increased incidence of part time (or low wage) employment, though estimates are less
precise in this smaller sample.
Persistency
Though estimated impacts on earnings, transfers and taxes did not support the notion
of child care as a public finance boon in the short run, we may question whether there
are long run effects that can help mitigate the costs. We therefore investigate whether
there is persistence in the labor supply response. To this end, we reestimate our baseline
IV-model using the outcome variables measured one to four years into the future. Notice
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that we maintain the conditioning on control variables from year t in order to avoid issues
associated with so-called “bad control” variables.19 Also, we include controls for the child
care coverage rate of older children in the treatment year, i.e. for the coverage rate for
3- and 4-year olds in year t when we consider impacts in t+ 2. For brevity, and because
estimates are not sufficiently precise on other groups, we focus on cohabiting mothers.
Estimates for the other groups may be found in the appendix.
Table 5 presents estimates from the IV model for cohabiting mothers. In column 2,
we report the estimated impact on outcomes one year later, then in column 3 estimates
on outcomes two years later, and so on. While effects fade out over time, our estimates
suggest that there is still relatively strong persistence. In particular, the impact on full
time-equivalent employment is almost as strong the following year and remains above 7
percentage points throughout this period. Effects on employment fade more quickly, but
remain statistically significant 3 years after the treatment. Other outcomes lose statistical
significance after year t+1. Note that the estimates for t+1 will partly include the direct
effect of child care use, since the child care year straddles the years t and t+ 1.
Figure 8 illustrates our estimates for cohabiting mothers by predicting outcomes with
and without any (formal) child care use and comparing this to the actual trend for pre-
reform mothers. More specifically, we start by constructing time series for labor supply
outcomes for mothers of 2-year olds in 2002. To construct the predicted series without
child care, we subtract the predicted effect of child care use at age 2 in each year, i.e.
yˆt2002 (m = 0) = y¯t2002 − βˆt · m¯2002 where βˆt is the estimate from our IV-model using yt
as the outcome and m¯t is mean child care use among the pre-reform mothers in year t.
Analogously, to construct the predicted series with full child care use, we add the predicted
effect of child care use at age 2 in each year, i.e. yˆt2002 (m = 1) = y¯t2002 + βˆt · (1− m¯2002).
Note that this should be interpreted as the predicted effect for a complier around this level,
not the overall effect of full child care coverage. Because effects are likely to be different
outside of the complier group, particularly in the group of never-takers who might be
expected to be less strongly attached to the labor market, we should be cautious about
extrapolating to the population at large.
Figure 8 shows the estimated time series for earnings, employment and full-time equiv-
alent for mothers. We first note that while about 70 % of mothers are employed prior to
birth, just over 60 % are employed in the year following birth. Similarly, around 45 % of
mothers work full time prior to birth while about 25 % work full time in the year following
birth. This is reflected in their earnings, which drop by about 20 % on average in the
year following birth.20 The figure illustrates how the exogenously driven increase in child
19Some of the controls, like education, could be considered endogenous to the child care coverage. This
is more likely the longer the time period between the treatment and the outcome. See Angrist and Pischke
(2008) for a discussion of bad controls.
20Note that the generous Norwegian parental leave arrangements, see footnote 10, may explain why
earnings and measures of employment don’t fall further: In practice, almost all Norwegian mothers take
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Table 5: Persistency: IV-results with lagged outcomes, cohabiting mothers
Outcome t (baseline) t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Earnings 49,231*** 23,005* 10,376 6,164 8,367
(12,612) (13,289) (14,070) (15,105) (15,679)
165,232 238,203 255,636 276,045 298,470
Tax 19,018*** 13,082*** 5,783 5,044 9,316
(5,467) (4,912) (6,754) (6,269) (8537)
67,042 81,808 83,904 85,291 90,699
Transfers, -3,360 -9,086** -6,315 2,451 -3,120
excl. cash-for-care (4,153) (4,595) (5,204) (4,606) (4,578)
49,843 53,538 56,992 58,473 60,189
Employed 0.294*** 0.128*** 0.083*** 0.069** 0.044
(0.0298) (0.0274) (0.0269) (0.0297) (0.0296)
0.634 0.745 0.763 0.773 0.787
Full time- 0.222*** 0.198*** 0.0916*** 0.0709** 0.0762**
equivalent (0.0278) (0.0331) (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0301)
0.351 0.469 0.480 0.503 0.530
Observations 283,868 282,667 281,874 281,311 280,818
Note: Estimates are from equation (1), with outcomes measured 1–4 years later. In addition to control
variables defined in Section 3, we control for child care coverage rates for older children in year t.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to parents of 2-year olds in 2002. * (p<0.10), **
(p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
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care use at age 2 is predicted to have both hastened the return to work of mothers and
that there is persistence in that mothers stay more attached to the labor market also in
the following years.
6 Specification checks
Despite our estimation strategy and the undersupply of formal care in the period, the
expansion in child care that we exploit is, of course, not randomized. In this section, we
challenge our empirical strategy in several different ways and also investigate alternative
explanations for our findings. Estimates for cohabiting mothers are reported in Table 6
with baseline estimates with and without controls reported at the top. For brevity, results
for other groups may be found in the appendix, Tables A.5–A.7 . Overall, robustness
checks support our empirical strategy for cohabiting mothers and fathers, while results
for the smaller groups of single mothers and non-resident fathers tend to vary more, in
line with the general impression of lower precision of these estimates.
Common time trends
The basic identifying assumption in our study rests on common time shocks across munic-
ipalities with different growth rates in child care coverage rates of 1 and 2 year olds. We
therefore start by challenging this assumption in a series of specification checks reported
in panel A of Table 6.
First, we perform a placebo test where we use as the outcome the labor supply of
mothers in year t − 3, i.e. one year before giving birth. Labor supply before birth
should not be affected by changes in the child care coverage rate that occur several years
later. If our estimations are, in contrast, picking up secular differences in the growth of
maternal labor supply over time which is just correlated with child care coverage rates,
then we would expect the placebo estimates to yield effects that go in the same direction
as estimates using contemporaneous outcomes. The placebo estimates are all close to zero
and insignificant, lending support to our empirical strategy.
To further challenge the assumption of common trends, we next allow for different time
trends in different municipalities. In the second and third rows of panel A, we admit
municipality-specific time trends by including a linear time trend (row 2) and a linear and
quadratic time trend (row 3) as controls in our baseline specification. This is a simple yet
demanding test of the assumption of common time shocks, that will remove systematic
trends in labor supply within municipalities. If, e.g., unobserved trends in labor supply
several months of parental leave, many for more than one year.
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Figure 8: Persistency: Labor supply of cohabiting mothers around birth, pre-reform
means and predicted with and without child care at age 2.
Note: The solid line plots average labor supply of cohabiting mothers of children born 2000. To construct
the dotted and dashed lines, we use the estimate from our baseline model, cf. Table 4. The lower dashed
line subtracts from the solid line the estimated effect of mean child care use of 2-year olds. The upper
dotted line adds the effect of increasing to full child care use at age 2.
Table 6: Specification checks for cohabiting mothers
Labor supply Weeks of empl. N
Earnings Empl. Full time >4h >30h
Baseline results 49,231*** 0.294*** 0.222*** 9.741*** 11.02*** 283,868
(12,612) (0.0298) (0.0278) (1.527) (1.588)
No controls 65,647*** 0.342*** 0.272*** 11.51*** 13.17*** 283,868
(18,212) (0.0328) (0.0311) (1.915) (1.860)
A. Common time trends
Placebo: Outcome -6,525 0.0216 -0.0575 0.480 1.918 193,567
in t− 3 (13,582) (0.0456) (0.0530) (2.192) (2.538)
Municipality-specific 72,859*** 0.317*** 0.270*** 11.51*** 12.66*** 283,868
linear time trends (14,267) (0.0493) (0.0512) (2.316) (2.675)
Municipality-specific 82,108*** 0.355*** 0.261*** 10.89*** 14.12*** 283,868
quadratic time trends (18,672) (0.0645) (0.0638) (3.055) (3.538)
Interacted 76,944*** 0.286*** 0.231*** 10.93*** 11.05*** 283,624
time shocks (11,049) (0.0405) (0.0373) (1.810) (2.113)
B. Reverse causality: Excess demand
Waiting lists 54,569*** 0.278*** 0.236*** 8.547*** 10.77*** 201,321
(11,887) (0.0393) (0.0392) (1.693) (1.985)
Waiting lists above 10 40,091*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 5.637*** 7.724*** 117,790
percent of available places (14,803) (0.0486) (0.0509) (1.765) (2.188)
C. Alternative drivers
Selective migration: 31,658* 0.295*** 0.185*** 8.504*** 10.73*** 271,963
residence fixed in t− 3 (18,478) (0.0377) (0.0329) (1.801) (2.216)
Endogenous fertility: 30,371*** 0.201*** 0.0904*** 8.590*** 8.780*** 344,123
include younger siblings (10,413) (0.0285) (0.0306) (1.417) (1.379)
Population growth: 74,946*** 0.272*** 0.221*** 10.26*** 11.65*** 283,929
instruments = slotspop2001 (9,950) (0.0286) (0.0282) (1.294) (1.538)
Older siblings 56,826*** 0.295*** 0.240*** 9.883*** 11.32*** 283,868
(11,312) (0.0330) (0.0331) (1.588) (1.744)
D. Family-specific fixed effects
Baseline, 56,399*** 0.261*** 0.198*** 8.479*** 8.033*** 70,907
sample > 2 children (15,490) (0.0487) (0.0551) (2.187) (2.770)
Individual fixed effects 35,865** 0.195*** 0.144** 4.501* 3.408 70,907
sample > 2 children (16,075) (0.0577) (0.0664) (2.355) (3.068)
Note: The table reports IV-estimates on child care use from a series of specification checks described in
the main text. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to
heteroskedasticity. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
were pushing up child care coverage rates and thereby driving our results, we would expect
estimates on child care coverage rates to drop towards zero when we include these trends.
Reassuringly, these estimates are remarkably stable to this inclusion.
Of course, we cannot be sure that unobserved trends are linear or quadratic. In row 4
of panel A, we therefore instead allow for different time shocks to labor supply depending
on pre-reform characteristics in each municipality. Note that we cannot include year-
by-municipality fixed effects, since this is the variation we exploit in our identification
strategy. Instead, we interact the yearly shocks with pre-reform characteristics, estimating
the following specification.
mikt =α1k + τ 1t + pi1CC1k,t−1 + pi2CC2kt +ϕ1tVk,2001 +Xiktθ1 + 
1
ikt (3)
yikt =α2k + τ 2t + βmikt +ϕ2tVk,2001 +Xiktθ2 + 
2
ikt (4)
Where ϕt is the time-varying coefficient on the prereform characteristics, denoted Vk,2001.
In this set we include a range of political, economical and geographical characteristics
measured in 2001, before the sample period.21 The yearly shocks to labor supply thus
consist of two parts: The common shock τt and a set of shocks ϕt that are propagated
through the pre-reform characteristics of the municipality. Again, we find that estimates
are very stable to this inclusion, cf. the fourth row in panel A of Table 6.
Excess demand
Our empirical strategy relies on growth in child care coverage rates being exogenous to
growth in labor supply within municipalities. As discussed in Section 4, a potential worry
could be that markets are not rationed, in which case growth in coverage rates could,
at least in part, be driven by growth in labor supply generated by increased demand,
and not vice versa. To investigate whether this might be driving our estimates, we could
narrow down our sample to municipalities with significant excess demand, where such
reverse causality should not be an issue. To this end, we exploit the data on waiting lists
for 0–3 year olds. As discussed above, this measure may be likely to underestimate total
demand.
In panel B of Table 6, we reduce our sample by narrowing down first to municipality-
years with waiting lists and then further to municipality-years where waiting lists make
up at least 10 % of the children below 3 years in the municipality, and run our baseline
model for the available years 2004–2008, when data on waiting lists are available.22 In
these samples, excess demand should be strong enough to mitigate worries about reverse
21Specifically, these include the share of left wing representatives in the municipal council, share of
females in the municipal council, the non-earmarked income per capita in the municipal accounts, a
dummy for municipalities with hydropower income, the share of the population living in urban areas, the
initial female labor force participation, initial child care coverage rate and initial unemployment rate.
22Note that baseline results for 2004-2008 are very close to results for the full period.
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causality. Estimates in these samples are very similar to our baseline estimates.
Alternative drivers
In panel C of Table 6, we investigate some alternative drivers that might have explained
our estimates. First, if caregivers with high levels of labor supply move to municipalies
that will expand child care, our estimates could be driven by selective migration. To test
for this, we ignore recent changes of residence: We consider a caregiver’s municipality
of residence to be the one where she resided in year t − 3, the year before giving birth.
If selective migration was driving the results, we should see estimates dropping towards
zero as we limit this possibility. Estimates are relatively stable, indicating that selective
migration is unlikely to be an issue.
Second, in line with previous literature we have considered the youngest child. This
ensures that the systematic spacing of births does not influence our estimates. If fertility
is endogenous to child care availability, however, this restriction might imply conditioning
on an endogenous variable and could bias our estimates. To check whether this might
be driving our results, we rerun the baseline specification, including also mothers that
have younger children. It is reassuring to see in Table 6 that the estimates are almost
unchanged.
Third, our instruments are constructed as the ratio of children in care to the population
of the same age. Changes in these rates will be driven both by changes in population as
well as changes in the supply of care. If population growth drives labor supply, or if, as
above, child care availability increases fertility, then this could cause bias in our estimates.
To investigate this, we change our specification by using the population in 2001 in the
denominator for the child care coverage rates. It is reassuring to see that the estimates
in row 3 in panel C of Table 6 are again very similar to our baseline estimates.
Fourth, we might worry that a contemporary expansion among older children con-
founds the estimates. We see from Figure 1a that the reform is associated with increases
in the coverage rate also for 3–5 year olds, and these children might have younger siblings
in our sample. If the child care use of these children correlates with that of their younger
siblings and also affects maternal labor supply, our estimates would be biased upwards. It
is comforting, however, to see that our estimates barely move when we include a control
for the child care coverage rate of 3-5 year old children.
Family fixed effects
Finally, in our baseline specification, we use municipality fixed effects. These will account
for all time-invariant determinants of labor supply at the municipality level and from
individual characteristics for which the composition across municipalities is fixed over
time. However, if the composition changes over time, and these characteristics are not
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controlled for, our results might be biased.
In Figure 6, we saw that the composition in terms of some important characteristics
did not seem to change systematically with increases in the coverage rate. As an additional
check, panel D of Table 6 reports estimates from a model with family-specific fixed effects.
This exploits that some parents have more than one child in the sample period to compare
parental labor supply outcomes across siblings, where one child is exposed to lower child
care coverage rates than the other. By relating the change in labor supply to the change
in coverage rates within families, we can hold constant all observable and unobservable
characteristics that are fixed within families over time. At the same time, the usual time
effects account for changes over time that are comparable across families.
Because parents with siblings in the sample period may be different from the rest of
the sample, we first rerun our baseline specification on this sample. To maintain clustering
at the municipality level, we include only mothers who reside in the same municipality at
each birth. The results in panel D show that in the reduced sample our baseline model
yields estimates that are almost identical to the baseline. When we include family fixed
effects, estimates are somewhat smaller but still quite similar overall and not significantly
different from baseline estimates. This indicates that our main results are unlikely to be
driven by changes in the composition of individuals across municipalities.
7 Conclusion
We investigate the labor supply effects of the use of child care for toddlers following a
Norwegian reform in 2002, exploiting the staggered expansion of child care across munic-
ipalities. To guard against endogeneity problems, we instrument individual child care use
with rationed municipal coverage rates, controlling for municipality and year fixed effects
to exploit only changes in coverage. Our approach is supported by a battery of robustness
tests that investigate alternative explanations for our findings.
Results show relatively large labor supply response among mothers of toddlers com-
pared to most of the existing literature. Cohabiting mothers seem to respond by moving
from no or little employment to more or less full-time work: We find an elasticity of
labor force participation with respect to child care use of around 0.3, indicating that 3
cohabiting mothers enter the labor force for each 10 toddlers who enroll in full time care.
These estimates should be compared to the pre-reform means: Before the reform, 63%
had at least substantial part-time work. We also find significant and positive effects on
full time employment.
Single mothers, on the other hand, seem to respond by moving from no employment to
part-time work. Per 5 toddlers of a single mother enrolled full time, we find that one single
mother enters the labor force, compared to a pre-reform mean of 62 % of single mothers
being out of the labor force. However, we find no effect on the probability of holding a
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full-time job, indicating that these mothers move from no employment to part-time work
in response to child care. We find no effects among fathers, nor among grandparents.
The labor supply estimates are in the upper range of the literature, which tends to find
effects of child care in the range of 0 to 0.2. This might indicate that the response to child
care availability differs for children of different ages. One explanation may be that the
counterfactual mode of care is different: In the absence of formal care, mothers of 2-year-
olds are more likely to stay at home, while mothers of older children may find informal
care arrangements, possibly using grandparents or other relatives, that enable them to
work even when child care is not available. This explanation may find some support in the
fact that we find no effects on the labor supply of working age grandparents. For fathers,
we find little effect, both for cohabiting fathers and for fathers not residing with the child.
This is in line with the literature, and suggests that mothers are still the primary caretaker
of young children in Norway.
Havnes and Mogstad (2011) study a Norwegian expansion of care for preschoolers in
the late 1970s, and find estimates around a fifth of what we do in this paper. While
our study focuses on younger children and on a much later time period, it is useful to
consider what may be driving the differences in the estimated effects. To shed light on
this, we have looked at survey data on the preferred mode of child care collected in 1968
and in 2002 (Pettersen, 2003; Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Administration, 1972;
Moafi and Bjørkli, 2011; Reppen and Rønning, 1999). For preschoolers in 1968, around
25 % of mothers stated a preference for informal solutions such as childminders, nannies
or relatives. The comparable number for toddlers in 2002 is around 6 %, indicating
that preferences of mothers considered in Havnes and Mogstad (2011)are quite different
from preferences of mothers in the 2000s. This could drive differences in the demand
for informal care, and in turn explain the large effects today compared to the 1970s.
Additionally, because maternal employment is much more prevalent in the period we
consider, the availability of informal sources of care could be more limited. This may be
particularly true because mothers in the 1970s typically relied on relatives, neighbors or
friends for child care needs (Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Administration, 1972).
We also investigate the response on total tax payments from mothers and fathers to
assess the degree to which increases in the tax base can offset some of the costs of the
subsidy. We find considerable increases in net tax payments, corresponding to a marginal
tax rate of about 40 % on the extra 50,000 NOK income. This is close to the average tax
rate paid by cohabiting mothers before the reform, and shows that there is some scope
for the costs of child care subsidies to be offset by increased tax revenue.
The results from our analysis are relevant to current political debates, considering that
the demand for child care for older children is more or less covered in Norway and many
western countries. Our findings therefore speak to the efficiency of further expansion,
and provide evidence for other countries and governments considering a move towards
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universally accessible, subsidized child care for young children.
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A Additional tables
This appendix presents various results that we could not fit in the main text. In particular,
most results for other samples than the main sample of cohabiting mothers are found here.
• Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 report detailed summary statistics for single mothers,
cohabiting fathers and non-resident fathers.
• Table A.4 reports main results for working age grandparents.
• Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 report specification checks for single mothers, cohabiting
fathers and non-resident fathers.
• Tables A.8, A.9 and A.10 report persistency analysis for single mothers, cohabiting
fathers and non-resident fathers.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for single mothers, 2002–2008
2002 2004 2006 2008
A. Outcome variables
Earnings (NOK) 76,279 81,964 95,042 128,101
(114,835) (120,484) (135,387) (166,619)
Tax 32,572 35,177 27,513 32,729
(68,281) (60,206) (51,812) (66,789)
Transfers, excl. cash for care 156,275 150,549 155,492 161,878
(73,977) (82,312) (85,066) (96,435)
Employed 0.289 0.284 0.306 0.364
(0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.48)
Full-time equivalent employment 0.133 0.135 0.150 0.182
(0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.39)
Weeks of 4 hours 19.49 20.31 21.02 24.75
employment (23.1) (23.8) (23.6) (23.8)
above 30 hours 11.49 12.58 12.90 15.78
(20.3) (21.2) (21.1) (22.4)
B. Control variables
Age 28.99 29.27 29.79 29.98
(6.09) (6.27) (6.30) (6.55)
Immigrant 0.0674 0.0760 0.100 0.108
(0.25) (0.26) (0.30) (0.31)
Years of education 12.97 13.09 13.19 13.28
(3.11) (3.23) (3.32) (3.44)
Number of children 1.695 1.703 1.744 1.717
(0.99) (1.04) (1.07) (1.07)
below 6 years old 1.289 1.280 1.272 1.273
(0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.51)
below 13 years old 1.556 1.537 1.564 1.541
(0.79) (0.80) (0.82) (0.81)
below 18 years old 1.656 1.654 1.684 1.660
(0.92) (0.95) (0.96) (0.97)
Local employment rate, childless men 0.673 0.703 0.727 0.797
(0.058) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056)
Observations 5,278 4,871 4,491 4,619
Note: The table gives biannual means and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the estimation sample.
Variables are defined in Section 3.
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for cohabiting fathers, 2002–2008
2002 2004 2006 2008
A. Outcome variables
Earnings (NOK) 356,127 373,361 420,824 490,135
(232,035) (290,088) (315,032) (374,122)
Tax 162,260 204,359 168,930 171,219
(180,796) (303,939) (244,858) (285,603)
Transfers, excl. cash for care 12,953 16,446 14,028 13,012
(41,721) (51,166) (49,043) (49,992)
Employed 0.919 0.902 0.915 0.928
(0.27) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26)
Full-time equivalent employment 0.848 0.820 0.844 0.865
(0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.34)
Weeks of 4 hours 43.38 43.00 43.63 44.76
employment (18.1) (18.5) (17.9) (16.8)
above 30 hours 41.65 41.08 41.73 42.83
(19.6) (20.1) (19.5) (18.7)
B. Control variables
Age 35.10 35.45 35.76 35.84
(5.73) (5.78) (5.79) (5.91)
Immigrant 0.0615 0.0713 0.0768 0.0903
(0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.29)
Years of education 14.83 14.98 15.11 15.21
(3.16) (3.18) (3.19) (3.20)
Number of children 2.068 2.055 2.054 2.039
(1.05) (1.05) (1.04) (1.04)
below 6 years old 1.510 1.516 1.516 1.523
(0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58)
below 13 years old 1.895 1.875 1.874 1.861
(0.85) (0.84) (0.83) (0.83)
below 18 years old 2.001 1.987 1.982 1.966
(0.96) (0.95) (0.94) (0.94)
Local employment rate, childless men 0.676 0.706 0.726 0.800
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.047)
Observations 42,156 39,284 40,201 41,703
Note: The table gives biannual means and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the estimation sample.
Variables are defined in Section 3.
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics for non-residing fathers, 2002–2008
2002 2004 2006 2008
A. Outcome variables
Earnings (NOK) 227,717 215,469 263,236 315,172
(185,741) (182,193) (224,525) (294,446)
Tax 96,308 116,361 102,842 107,709
(111,020) (142,343) (141,550) (133,229)
Transfers, excl. cash for care 35,143 44,022 39,549 37,934
(58,343) (66,673) (74,148) (73,574)
Employed 0.717 0.652 0.707 0.738
(0.45) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44)
Full-time equivalent employment 0.560 0.484 0.552 0.585
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Weeks of 4 hours 31.67 30.19 32.87 34.85
employment (23.4) (23.8) (23.0) (22.5)
above 30 hours 28.85 26.66 29.84 31.93
(24.0) (24.3) (23.7) (23.5)
B. Control variables
Age 31.92 32.23 32.66 32.85
(7.24) (7.43) (7.41) (7.73)
Immigrant 0.0710 0.0706 0.0923 0.0964
(0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.30)
Years of education 12.86 12.93 12.92 12.93
(2.90) (2.97) (2.98) (3.11)
Number of children 1.785 1.792 1.822 1.857
(1.12) (1.15) (1.15) (1.18)
below 6 years old 1.333 1.323 1.323 1.337
(0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.59)
below 13 years old 1.585 1.580 1.596 1.610
(0.83) (0.85) (0.85) (0.87)
below 18 years old 1.694 1.697 1.729 1.744
(0.97) (1.01) (1.01) (1.02)
Local employment rate, childless men 0.674 0.702 0.724 0.794
(0.057) (0.054) (0.061) (0.060)
Observations 4,650 4,249 3,967 4,026
Note: The table gives biannual means and standard deviations (in parentheses) in the estimation sample.
Variables are defined in Section 3.
Table A.4: IV-results for working age grandparents
Maternal Maternal Paternal Paternal
grandmothers grandfathers grandmothers grandfathers
A. First stage
CC1k,t−1 0.538*** 0.541*** 0.533*** 0.536***
(0.0185) (0.0183) (0.0217) (0.0185)
CC2k,t -0.0153 -0.00914 -0.00302 -0.00154
(0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0184) (0.0187)
F 590.7 632.6 501.4 743.3
B. Second stage outcomes
Earnings 825 3,927 5,655 -11,274
(7029.6) (12636.2) (6,303) (10,875)
148,787 271,721 142,207 260,781
Employed 0.0112 -0.0311* 0.00336 -0.0260
(0.0176) (0.0165) (0.0190) (0.0194)
0.588 0.709 0.556 0.677
Full-time 0.0106 -0.0298 0.0361** -0.0150
(0.0166) (0.0183) (0.0171) (0.0204)
0.353 0.628 0.334 0.595
Weeks of above 4h 0.240 -0.652 -0.0122 -0.850
employment (0.925) (0.968) (0.913) (1.008)
above 31.72 32.25 30.38 31.04
above 30h 1.052 -0.856 1.960* 0.206
(0.916) (0.966) (1.047) (1.037)
20.18 29.85 18.98 28.52
Observations 217,210 182,801 192,324 155,629
Note: Estimates are from equations (1) and (2). Outcome and control variables are defined in Section
3. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to
heteroskedasticity. Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to grandparents of 2-year
olds in 2002. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Table A.5: Specification checks for single mothers
Labor supply Weeks of empl. N
Earnings Empl. Full time >4h >30h
Baseline results 19,340 0.225** 0.0486 12.24** 2.424 33,288
(28,999) (0.107) (0.0737) (5.817) (4.485)
No controls 46,898 0.307*** 0.106 15.7*** 5.75 33,288
(31,542) (0.110) (0.0757) (5.83) (4.56)
A. Common time trends
Placebo: Outcome 1,872 0.0127 0.102 -1.207 -2.459 20,947
in t− 3 (42,915) (0.184) (0.153) (7.837) (8.301)
Municipality-specific 86,762* 0.592*** 0.302** 22.10* 8.973 33,288
linear time trends (50,344) (0.224) (0.151) (11.44) (9.211)
Municipality-specific 81,412 0.708** 0.225 27.17* 6.711 33,288
quadratic time trends (72,065) (0.320) (0.220) (16.09) (13.02)
Interacted 81,412 0.708** 0.225 27.17* 6.711 33,288
time shocks (72,065) (0.320) (0.220) (16.09) (13.02)
B. Reverse causality: Excess demand
Waiting lists 10,161 0.296* 0.0645 10.93 -2.666 22,925
(42,795) (0.152) (0.112) (7.779) (6.370)
Waiting lists above 10 2,859 0.181 0.121 6.040 -3.325 13,270
percent of available places (62,090) (0.215) (0.151) (9.788) (7.904)
C. Alternative drivers
Selective migration: 32,228 0.279** 0.0914 8.462 5.910 31,815
residence fixed in t− 3 (33,157) (0.117) (0.0847) (6.381) (5.286)
Endogenous fertility: 31,543 0.182* 0.144** 11.95** 6.352 30,910
include younger siblings (21,759) (0.110) (0.0644) (6.053) (4.545)
Population growth: -887 0.129 -0.0182 10.17* 0.0240 33,299
instruments = slotspop2001 (27,684) (0.106) (0.0743) (5.516) (5.030)
Older siblings 23,512 0.241** 0.0678 11.12* 1.926 33,288
(30,985) (0.117) (0.0816) (6.103) (4.936)
D. Family-specific fixed effects
Baseline, 88,433 0.310 -0.0933 16.59 -13.74 1,790
sample > 2 children (64,574) (0.280) (0.203) (13.62) (11.48) 202
Individual fixed effects 88,302 0.340 -0.0417 4.879 -10.22 1,790
sample > 2 children (72,261) (0.340) (0.247) (16.79) (13.87) 202
Note: The table reports IV-estimates on child care use from a series of specification checks described in
the main text. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to
heteroskedasticity. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Table A.6: Specification checks for cohabiting fathers
Labor supply Weeks of empl. N
Earnings Empl. Full time >4h >30h
Baseline results -45,970 -0.0187 0.00848 -0.0966 -0.568 283,687
(32,269) (0.0219) (0.0288) (1.351) (1.500)
No controls -18,586 0.00676 0.0431 1.391 1.093 283,687
(31,619) (0.0244) (0.0314) (1.494) (1.658)
A. Common time trends
Placebo: Outcome 22,543 0.0210 0.0681 2.978 1.772 196,725
in t− 3 (34,666) (0.0342) (0.0435) (1.955) (2.119)
Municipality-specific 15,222 0.0218 0.0722* 1.333 0.885 283,687
linear time trends (30,332) (0.0313) (0.0437) (2.077) (2.205)
Municipality-specific -7,384 0.0399 0.0573 2.829 2.352 283,687
quadratic time trends (51,755) (0.0381) (0.0562) (2.655) (2.846)
Interacted 2,803 0.0177 0.0563* 1.901 1.557 283,436
time shocks (28,307) (0.0241) (0.0340) (1.678) (1.829)
B. Reverse causality: Excess demand
Waiting lists -29,248 -0.0105 0.0292 0.737 0.246 201,193
(34,933) (0.0270) (0.0344) (1.619) (1.767)
Waiting lists above 10 -77,448* -0.0274 0.0157 2.044 0.151 117,715
percent of available places (42,057) (0.0299) (0.0380) (1.621) (1.897)
C. Alternative drivers
Selective migration: -120,810* -0.0271 0.0160 -1.473 -1.309 275,397
residence fixed in t− 3 (63,504) (0.0251) (0.0352) (1.579) (1.748)
Endogenous fertility: -59,027** -0.0102 -0.0270 0.0584 -0.189 343,898
include younger siblings (22,867) (0.0183) (0.0244) (1.205) (1.378)
Population growth: -82 0.0158 0.0241 1.528 1.601 283,741
instruments = slotspop2001 (29,403) (0.0189) (0.0263) (1.122) (1.243)
Older siblings -39,739 -0.0125 0.0281 0.362 -0.0394 283,687
(29,777) (0.0233) (0.0297) (1.404) (1.553)
D. Family-specific fixed effects
Baseline, -111,522** -0.0459 0.00887 1.492 1.730 70,783
sample > 2 children (46,367) (0.0301) (0.0454) (1.965) (2.443)
Individual fixed effects -151,387** -0.0659** 0.0289 0.884 1.051 70,783
sample > 2 children (75,823) (0.0331) (0.0519) (1.642) (2.147)
Note: The table reports IV-estimates on child care use from a series of specification checks described in
the main text. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to
heteroskedasticity. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Table A.7: Robustness checks for non-residing fathers
Labor supply Weeks of empl. N
Earnings Empl. Full time >4h >30h
Baseline results -8,241 -0.0158 0.0330 -1.343 -1.053 29,272
(26,111) (0.0502) (0.0624) (2.615) (2.612)
No controls 43,809 0.0425 0.121* 0.990 1.404 29,272
(28,737) (0.0558) (0.0670) (2.808) (2.614)
A. Common time trends
Placebo: Outcome -46,404 0.00910 -0.114 -1.506 -7.057 19,381
in t− 3 (36,332) (0.104) (0.0974) (4.706) (5.470)
Municipality-specific -3,866 -0.0107 0.0395 -0.0705 -0.0368 29,272
linear time trends (28,935) (0.0589) (0.0669) (2.942) (2.930)
Municipality-specific 10,641 -0.0116 0.0439 0.466 0.367 29,272
quadratic time trends (33,407) (0.0592) (0.0684) (3.056) (3.031)
Interacted 37,328 0.108 0.215* 2.757 3.826 29,196
time shocks (54,771) (0.0912) (0.117) (4.870) (5.577)
B. Reverse causality: Excess demand
Waiting lists -35,513 -0.0536 0.0222 -0.810 -1.044 20,133
(35,620) (0.0674) (0.0780) (3.622) (3.581)
Waiting lists above 10 -11,425 0.0854 0.0658 -0.190 -0.470 11,324
percent of available places (47,610) (0.104) (0.114) (5.606) (5.458)
C. Alternative drivers
Selective migration: -72,017 0.138 0.0330 -3.886 -1.973 28,500
residence fixed in t− 3 (61,792) (0.127) (0.152) (6.908) (6.999)
Endogenous fertility: -43,588** -0.0292 -0.0894 -1.569 -1.165 32,630
include younger siblings (21,352) (0.0543) (0.0570) (2.739) (2.797)
Population growth: -136,199 -0.158 -0.0676 -6.728 -6.093 29,290
instruments = slotspop2001 (94,641) (0.167) (0.159) (7.333) (7.492)
Older siblings -22,280 -0.0706 0.0172 -1.754 -1.880 29,272
(30,375) (0.0573) (0.0684) (2.990) (2.848)
D. Family-specific fixed effects
Baseline, 7,264 -0.0908 -0.163 11.48 12.39 1,810
sample > 2 children (94,931) (0.246) (0.276) (12.95) (13.48)
Individual fixed effects 57,566 0.196 -0.0583 6.949 9.310 1,810
sample > 2 children (66,962) (0.205) (0.220) (10.14) (10.53)
Note: The table reports IV-estimates on child care use from a series of specification checks described in
the main text. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to
heteroskedasticity. * (p<0.10), ** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Table A.8: Persistency: IV-results with lagged outcomes, single mothers
Outcome t (baseline) t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Earnings 19,340 -5,793 -33,743 -30,653 -21,369
(28,999) (25,243) (28,021) (31,862) (32,835)
76,279 122,494 149,617 173,734 195,434
Tax -6,350 6,738 -9,462 -4,307 94,13
(13,986) (9,352) (10,464) (10,336) (10,875)
32,572 36,102 40,166 44,678 50,143
Transfers, 38,780** 31,943* 38,610** 14,703 23,793
excl .cash for care (18,020) (18,690) (19,260) (18,509) (19.038)
156,275 149,231 134,009 126,253 122.663
Employed 0.225** 0.150 0.00248 0.0461 -0.0387
(0.107) (0.0944) (0.0957) (0.0940) (0.0983)
0.289 0.391 0.471 0.522 0.561
Full-time 0.0486 0.0508 -0.000325 0.00249 0.133
(0.0737) (0.0732) (0.0746) (0.0850) (0.0959)
0.133 0.197 0.237 0.279 0.313
Observations 33,288 33,062 32,885 32,754 32,653
Note: Estimates are from equation (1), with outcomes measured 1–4 years later. In addition to control
variables defined in Section 3, we control for child care coverage rates for older children in year t.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to parents of children born in 2002. * (p<0.10),
** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Table A.9: Persistency: IV-results with lagged outcomes, cohabiting fathers
Outcome t (baseline) t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Earnings -45,971 2,842 -5,067 1,519 2,639
(32,269) (21,120) (19,196) (20,314) (20,278)
356,127 435,776 463,734 49,4573 523,611
Tax -8,411 9,471 14,929 31,774** 13,500
(11,901) (15,930) (20,027) (15,484) (15,461)
162,260 179,866 185,925 185,715 191,077
Transfers, -584 619 -1,191 -6,253 -8,168*
excl .cash for care (3,647) (5,162) (4,395) (4,579) (4,895)
12,953 17,652 19,512 20,360 21,503
Employed -0.0187 -0.0197 -0.0112 -0.0106 -0.0173
(0.0219) (0.0189) (0.0215) (0.0237) (0.0229)
0.919 0.913 0.912 0.910 0.908
Full-time 0.00848 0.000609 -0.0233 -0.00683 0.00878
(0.0288) (0.0235) (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0266)
0.848 0.845 0.849 0.851 0.852
Observations 283,687 282,408 281,474 280,790 280,217
Note: Estimates are from equation (1), with outcomes measured 1–4 years later. In addition to control
variables defined in Section 3, we control for child care coverage rates for older children in year t.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to parents of children born in 2002. * (p<0.10),
** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
Table A.10: Persistency: IV-results with lagged outcomes, non-residing fathers
Outcome t (baseline) t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Earnings -8,241 7,594 -28,234 -18,694 -46,837
(26,111) (55,793) (30,637) (28,529) (33,966)
227,717 270,457 292,054 312,342 334,088
Tax -17,492 -15,022 -8,577 -346 -5,543
(13,658) (12,680) (16,715) (13,691) (21,168)
96,308 108,836 112,865 112,104 116,645
Transfers, 6,401 9,440 16,441 1,784 2,534
excl .cash for care (7,757) (8,227) (11,850) (10,160) (11,565)
35,143 45,805 49,769 5,2055 54,866
Employed -0.0158 -0.0414 0.00333 -0.0224 -0.0369
(0.0502) (0.0515) (0.0540) (0.0498) (0.0537)
0.717 0.703 0.707 0.709 0.712
Full-time 0.0330 0.00222 -0.0402 -0.0674 -0.0683
(0.0624) (0.0553) (0.0565) (0.0574) (0.0569)
0.560 0.551 0.571 0.579 0.594
Observations 29,272 29,071 28,927 28,789 28,659
Note: Estimates are from equation (1), with outcomes measured 1–4 years later. In addition to control
variables defined in Section 3, we control for child care coverage rates for older children in year t.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
Pre-reform means of outcomes are underlined and refer to parents of children born in 2002. * (p<0.10),
** (p<0.05), *** (p<0.01)
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